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The goal of this chapter is to explore the nodon of peace appropriate to just war thought. Some just war principles generate a number of inferences about peace. Traditionally, just war thinking has been divided into two areas of moral concern: jus ad bellum, concerned with the political decision to go to war, andyW in hello, addtessing the conduct of war. In recent years, rwo new areas have emerged: jus post bellum and jus ex hello. Both are concerned with the end or aftermath of war: jus post bellum focuses on what ought to be done aftet victory, jus ex hello looks at the moral aspects of continuing or exidng a war under circumstances where victory is unlikely. 1 Each derives from jus ad bellum, since treatment of war's goals and the conditions under which it should be terminated have in the past come underad bellum.
Jus in Bello: Peace as the Absence of War
In discussing peace in relation to war, I deal first with jus in bello, since there is less to be said than is the case with;w ad bellum.
Jus in hello thought became prominent in the early modern period of die sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as jus ad bellum diinking receded owing to die recognition by legal dieorists that, while there might be such a thing as natural law, there was no supranational authority or, for most purposes, any enforceable international law. Without them, the notions of legitimate authority and just cause were inapplicable in any informative sense. Among early modern theoiists, Vitoria notes the difficulty of determining that only one side has just cause. GentiU holds that there can be justice on both sides, so the "rights of war" must apply to bodi parties. Gtotius follows Ciceio in holding diat waging war is not inconsistent with the "laws of nature." Hobbes takes that position to its logical conclusion in holding drat natural law requires states to fight to promote rheir interests.^ Their views (diough not Suarez's) amounted to abandoning>i-ad bellum principles.
Jus in bello concerns the conduct of war, as well as the treatment of enemy soldiers, prisoners, and non-combatants. Back then, it also dealt with the forms to be observed when initiating wat, in patticulat the stateto-state formal declaration of war, along with notifying theit lespective citizens drat a state of war now existed.^ It could also include issuing a formal ultimatum prior to declaration of war. Some of these forms have evolved into the contemporary notion that UN permission should be obtained before going to war (except when under direct attack).
In the jus in bello perspective, peace is simply the absence of formal war. War is legally and morally permissible only if it observes certain norms and limits, and;^ in bello norms aim at minimizing the negative effects of the state of war.
Ms in Bello: War and Peace as States-of-Affairs
Thus, in jus in bello diinking, war and peace are mutually exclusive statesof-affairs, with peace constituted by the absence of wat. Grotius is probably the first to make explicit the notion of war and peace as states-of-affaits; Cicero defined war as a "contention by force." A usage has obtained, however, which designates by the word not an action but a state {nofz actio sed status); dius war is a state of diose contending by force, viewed simply as such.^ This legal view of war and peace as mutually exclusive states captures the core idea of early modern jus in bello thinking by jurists and rulers. Arguably, it has continued to be a, if not the, foundational element in what we today think of as traditional just war theory up to 1914.
It indicates a rough notion of peace, characterized by the following elements. First, peace is to be understood as a legally normative state of affairs, equivalent to a state of non-war. In a given instance, the peace in question may be characterized by an arms race, border tensions, economic or technological sabotage, or (internally) civil unrest and ethnic resentment. But that would still be peace, within the meaning Q[jus in bello s legal notion of peace. In the jus in bello perspective, the Cold War that lasted nearly half a century was not a war.
Second, only established states have the right to engage in war, and that right is subject to their fulfilling various legal formaUties in launching war and in treating the other state's soldiers and civilians. Outside of those boundaries, any military acrion, parricularly rebellion, was deemed criminal, analogous to piracy and banditry Social injustice and internal polirical oppression were normally excluded from being relevant to the morality of war.
Third, war and peace are all-or-nothing states; they are not matters of degree, e.g., being more peaceful or less peaceful. Fourth, pohtical trends towards war or towards peace can play no role within jus in hello.
Fifth, considering war and peace as states-of-affairs abstracts from the agents, i.e., the governments, responsible for creating or choosing war, as well as from its causes and jusrificarion (if any), and the beiligetents' intenrions. It is concerned only with the agents' conduct ofthe war.
Accordingly in bello implies that peace is: (a) a srate of affairs, (b) defined legally not politically or morally (where morality is independent of law), as a formal absence of war, and (c) committing states to elaborate procedures and restrictions if they decide to terminate it by going to war.
Jus ad Bellum's Paradox: War Intends Peace
Jus ad bellum thought addresses the war decision and the use of war to achieve certain goals that include peace. It concerns moving from peace to war and from war to peace. Accotdingly, it has significant implications for how peace is to be understood.
Classical or pre-modern jus ad bellum thought (e.g., Aquinas) looked to notions of legitimate authoiity, just cause, and right intention to piovide the basic framework for evaluating the morality of war-making. Restoring a lost or threatened peace and stability was the duty of legitimate authority just cause was constituted by thteats to peace and older or to the lives of a significant numbei of the populace, and right intention aimed at the defeat of those who had unjustly started war or insurrection and the restoration of peaceful order.
A contemporary version oi jus ad bellum thought (1) might expand who could qualify as legitimate authority to include the leaders of insurlectionaiy gioups and a vaiiety of non-state insthuuons, (2) would suppoit in principle the claim that the seeds of war aie sown by oppression and injustice, and (3) would (at least in the line of thinking found in recent jus post bellum thought) consider that the victotious powers had a moral responsibility to establish some elements of a just social order in the defeated state. Items (2) and (3) are relevant to the kind of peace just war thought is interested in. They also appear to set standards for peace.^ As regards just cause, if peace weie simply the absence of a state of wat, any going to wat would be an attack on peace and hence moially unjustifiable. But in taking it that war could be jusrified oi even morally required, the jus ad bellum tiadition indicates that the emergence of just cause means the formal peace that may still exist is significantly reduced in moral value. Augustine goes so far as to say it is no longer a genuine peace, since its continuance now depends upon submission to aggression or worse.'' Even if none ofthe other jus ad bellum condirions were met, the possibility that a just cause for going to war could sometimes exist implies that the value of peace is not absolute or always overriding. That is the first key element in the just war tradition's notion of peace.
Right intention has traditionally been taken to mean intending or aiming at peace. But (as Augustine remarked) even the wars of aggressors ultimately intend peace.^ Right intention must therefore aim at a peace that meets certain moral standards: peace with justice, or peace with a sufficiently just international order. The notion of right intention implies that, as well as the value of peace, other values would have to be promoted, both for their own sake and because they make peace more secure. The second key element in the jus ad bellum notion of peace is that the right intention crkerion indicates that the value of peace can be realized only when its implementation is integrated with at least parrial realization of certain other values.
In the ideal scenario, where the aggressor has been defeated, the victors' intenrion would be to undo or rectify the injustice or aggression that gave just cause for the war. But it may be that as the war progresses it becomes clear that they may have to setde for less than complete rectification of the injustice, since the cost of such rectificarion may now be disproportionate to the good to be attained. This is the scenario where the value of peace may outweigh some of the other values. In short: while the formal peace of the absence of war may be of lesser value \rvjus ad bellum thought, a comprehensive peace may not be morally possible, so that the wronged party may have to setde for an imperfect peace that does not rectify all or even most of the injustices that constituted just cause for going to war in the first instance.^ The rationally assignable relative weighting given to peace and other particular values may change during the course of the war. This is a third element in the jus ad bellum notion of peace.
Like War, Peace Emerges from a Context
In jus in bello thought, peace and war are relatively static notions, defined (in part) by various legal criteria, for the purposes of identifying the duries and rights of combatants and non-combatants. Jus in bello concepts and principles do not address peace or war as such, since they apply only within the framework of an ongoing war.
By contrast, while most attention is paid to jus ad bellum thought at times when war is imminent, it is also relevant during dmes of peace. At the time of writing (2016), the US government is aware that there is some probabihty of future conflicts with Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran. War with any of those countries is not at present imminent or likely, so there is scope fot crafting and implementing policies that might avert war with those states. Not merely would that be generally desirable, it is also whatyW ad bellum implies should be done. If a crisis occurred in a few years' rime berween the United States and one of those states, it would be hatd for the United States to claim it had just cause fot going to wat or to persuade anybody (including itself) that it was capable of morally realistic right intenrion if in the previous years it had been oblivious to the risk of war and had done little to manage conflict or deter aggression, or if its earlier responses had been overly placatory or overly aggressive. Similarly, if a few years from now the United States found itself deciding on war with one of those states, what would be required to meet the right intention condirion then would probably be required now as a matter of polirical prudence.
Historiographical works on the causes of parricular wars usually have much to say about states' polirical failures and miscalculations in the years prior to the war. While law plays a primary role with respect to jus in bello requiremenrs, its role is smaller-and more ambiguous-^with respect to jus ad bellum. Here, the historian and polidcal scientist play a latger role, since the causes of war are rooted in cultures, narional needs, and state policies that precede the war, often by many years. While the range of whar could count as just cause and as right intention is limited by legal constraints, their specification cannot be ahistorical and apolitical: what qualifies as just cause and what qualifies as right intention are to a significant degiee contextual, which means that it is not just a matter of ethics and law, but also a mattei of history and politics. History indicates that the just cause criterion has two implications for governments: (1) Don't give other countries just cause to go to war with you; (2) Within leason, so conduct youi policies that you do not unexpectedly find yourself with a just cause for war under circumstances in which war is hard to avoid. The law cannot replace the polirical art of historically informed management of international relarions.^ Ontologically in jus ad bellum thought, peace is more apdy viewed as a relarion than as a state-of-affairs. The development of effective internarional law is unquesrionably desirable, and helps reduce the scope for war. But its enforcement depends upon the good will, the power, and the interests of the sovereign states, and these change, for better or worse, through their relations with other states.
The classical just war tradition viewed the state's right as based upon its duty to protect the people. Its contemporary version refuses to conflate protecrion of the people with narional self-defense, noring that the people ought not necessarily be thought of as just the state's own cirizens.'° The possibility of morally warranted resort to war is part of a theory of good governance, which includes helping to maintain international order and protecting the oppressed, and to build whatever peace would be politically practical in the context of that twin commitment.
While international law is important in relation to those goals, it is not enough: diere is no algorithm or formal decision procedure that QO\M fully replace the role of human polirical judgment of when war is necessary, prudent, or justified (three different judgment types). (Even if there were such a formal decision procedure, implemenring or imposing it would amount to an undemocradc disempowerment of the peoples of the various nations.) Law can go some way towards determining the conditions under which going to war would be permissible, but it offers less with respect to when going to war would be necessary, and even less with respect to when going to war might be morally required of one's own country.^' Just cause and right intention norions imply that peace, of the "thick" pohtically substantial kind, as distinct from the formal kind, is not a given, once a peace treaty has been signed. To use a common slogan: after one has won the war, one must then win the peace. That is a matter of developing a certain kind of relation between the rwo states, and maybe even their peoples as well. Building the peace relation between the state and other states or relevant non-state agents requires a number of coherent policies consistently followed over a number of years. These policies and actions should aim to promote order and protect people's rights, by a range of policy tools including: mflitary intervention, peace enforcement, armed deterrence, arms reduction, outright war, measured concessions, being willing to suffer and tolerate certain provocarions, and other options.
The Practical Goal of Imperfect Peace
In the mid-nineteenth century, Biitish junst Sir Henry Maine remarked: "War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modetn invention."*^ This counterintuitive idea merits teasing out.
While there were short-lived peace movements in medieval Christendom, it was not undl the Enlightenment that the idea of abolishing war was seriously mooted. The catastrophe of two wodd wars and the arrival of nuclear weapons generated a new urgency about eliminating war. Under modern conditions, it was hard to credit the view that war was anything but fundamentally irrational. Yet despite genetal acceptance of that claim, peace remained elusive. On occasion, governments might find they no longer knew how not to go to war. Sometimes, controlled initial moves towards preparation for war, intended to deter, might tiigger a chain of events leading to an out-ofcontrol escalation into full-scale war.
On the other hand, calls for universal or unilatetal disarmament were neither plausible nor persuasive when proposed in a way that cavalietly ignored nations' reasonable and durable interests. Given these complexities, the idea of inventing peace expressed the intuition that the only way to find out what peace is to see what works first, leaving theorizing until afterwards.
Mere absence of armed conflict, even when accompanied by serious injustice, might still in some contexts be enough peace to satisfy people. Where a war drags on with no end in sight, with high casualties and considerable collateral harm to the civihan population, the populace would probably be glad of a simple cessation of the violence. Formal peace is not completely without value.
At the other end of the scale would be the Kantian idea of perfect peace. While unrealizable, and dangerous if taken to be realizable, it could function as a kind of legulative ideal shaping the way governments and peoples work for peace. What people would view as a decent peace, imperfect enough to be practically achievable, would still involve considerably more than the mere absence of violence. That is the kind of peace to which j^'w ad bellum is oriented.
{\)An imperfect decent peace depends on building a political relationship.
After the formal peace setdement, the political relations that ground peace must be buih. After World War II, relations between West Germany and its former enemies in the West were uncertain and sometimes uneasy into the eariy 1960s. The German leaders were unsure of whether its former enemies would allow it to reindustrialize or to create its own army later whether they would sustain it against encroachment by the USSR, and later yet whether they were merely tactical allies against the USSR or were genuine friends. At the time of German reunificarion in 1990, German uncertainty about its aUies' atritudes received some confirmation in French and British reluctance to endorse reunification, which was counterbalanced by the United States' unequivocal support. Even half a century after Worid War II, the peace process was not enrirely complete.
(2) An imperfect decent peace is the morally appropriate goal.
In modern rimes, while ethics is seen in certain quarters as nebulous or even subjecrive, law is viewed as more serious and objective in relation to establishing a global jusrice. Yet the legal approach is inevitably drawn to absolute notions of war and peace, for once the law is in place it must be obeyed, regardless of pohrical circumstances or prudential judgment. Jus in bello principles can be given a significant degree of legal embodiment. But attempting to come up with law that determines, for any government, the circumstances under which it is prohibited, permitted, or required to go to wat would be overreach that might on some occasions do more harm than good, not to menrion that it would effectively eliminate governments as legitimate authorities relative to war and peace, replacing them solely with the law (or rhe UN).!"* Such perfectionism in this area is poliricalfy naive, and that is a moral failing. Jus post bellum thought perhaps relied on an image of war overiy focused on the United States' mihtary engagements in the 1980-2003 period with the hope that great military power should be able to guarantee comprehensive polirical justice thereafter. Here, war's end and subsequent peace could be thought of primarily in legal terms. But such cases represent only a tiny minority of wars and their endings.
A morally and legally perfect peace is rarely attainable. The Enlightenment dream that with enough law and just social structures war would (as Marx said of the state) "wither away" natuially died in the honors of the twentieth century; we now know too much histoty and know far more than did the Enlightenment about the dark side of the human subconscious and its atavistic impulses.'' To the extent that the tacit ideal of perfect peace easily attainable shapes people's interpretation of the jus ad bellum criteria, it genetates an excessively stringent apolitical interpretation of them that will either point towards the waging of total war, or else make the just war tradition converge on pacifism. Each outcome undermines ji/s ad helium thinking.
(3) That an impeffect decent peace may be a cause of later wars is morally tolerable, provided the peace holds for a significant period of time.
Most peace setdements contain the seeds of future wars. No marter how carefully the peace setdement is crafted, sooner or later subsequent historians will trace at least some of the causes of a later war to that setdement. But it would be unteasonable to take this fact as necessatily rendering the setdement morally flawed. Just as there could be no war to end war (othet than one that wiped out the human race), so there can be no peace settlement that eliminates the need for future such settlements.
Where it is obvious to the relevant governments at the time of the settlement that the peace they ptopose has a high probability of leading to war in the not-so-distant futute, they act wrongly in imposing such a peace. A similar verdict can be rendered in cases where the peace terms are so onerous for the defeated patties (e.g., the terms of the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and Russia) that they will probably repudiate them at the first opportunity. In such cases, there are good grounds for arguing that the treaty fails to intend peace, and intends instead eithei conquest oi strategic positioning fot a future war with the defeated power, neither of which could be morally acceptable.
Here I am concerned with the cases wheie the peace tieaty is not obviously flawed in such a fashion, and seems to reasonable obseivers to give some hope for future peace between the former belligerents. Even in such cases, it is the rare peace settlement that lasts for more than a century Even where the defeated power is not meditating revenge or resumption ofthe wai at the eadiest opportunity, even where the victor's government is not planning on ignoring the restraints of the tieaty to take unfair advantage 6 Just War Thought and the Notion of Peace 115 of die defeated country it is still die case that some of the unintended consequences of the war and its conclusion may include conditions increasing the probability of a subsequent war. Compared to die 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the various treaties of 1919-1920 with the defeated Central Powers were less predatory and to some extent aimed at doing justice to formedy subject peoples, and yet they too were bitterly resented by die defeated countries, notably Germany and Hungary As can be expected, grossly unjust peace-treaties have a high probability of generating future war, but even relatively just and moderate peace treaties may in historical hindsight, serve to make war more likely.'''
The 1815 Congress of Vienna was relatively successful in stabilizing Europe after the upheaval of the Napoleonic wars, if die fact that there was no general European war for the next 100 years can be taken as evidence for that claim. Of course, since there were numerous smaller European wars after 1815, it would be foolhardy to claim that the Congress settlement had no causal role in relation to subsequent wars. But, since eighteenth century Europe had suffered four major continent-wide wars, and since no general European war occurred between 1815 and 1914, the Congress of Vienna's peace setdement appears comparatively successfiil.
That imperfect achievement, even if partly a matter of luck, must suffice from a moral viewpoint: the way a war is ended must be judged relatively successful if it is followed by at least 30 years' peace between the belligerents. Even the armed stalemate between North Koiea and South Korea since 1953 would seem, certainly ro Koreans who lived through the ravages of the Korean war (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) , to count as a relative success in providing peace and stability for a half century In cases where former enemies become allies, perhaps friends, as Japan and Germany became US allies and friends after Worid War II, or Prussia and Austria became allies and friends after their brief war in 1866, it counts as a very successful peace-making, even if one of the causes of its success is the fear of a mutual enemy These outcomes or aftermaths of war suggest the value for a government (like the United States), envisaging the rising probability that it may have to go to war with a certain country of thinking through what jus ad bellum's right intenrion criterion would mean, not just for the war and its termination, but also for the subsequent future relarionship with that country (4) An imperfect peace provides the opportunity for, and a fragile peace may even give impetus to, reforms that promote justice, thereby reducing the probability of future conflict.
This condition is pardcuiatiy applicable in the case of intetcommunal or ethnic conflict. People value peace not just for the good of not having armed clashes in their towns and ciries, but also for the goods that are made possible by the absence of armed conflict.''' The goods of a populace that is fed and teasonably secure, of a working economy of a functioning legal system and some protection of people's rights, depend on the existence of an organized society not torn apart by war or even constantly destabilized by lowdevel conflict. Such a sociery where those goods obtain might sdll fall short of being a just society, but at least it is a functioning society, of some value to ordinary people compared to prolonged anarchy The point is: such a society is sufficiendy secure that it can afford to spend less on its military and more on feeding, educating, and enriching hs citizens. The fruits of peace enhance the peace.
Approaching the issue from the other side, wars and social disorder arise from the failute of good governance, and failure of the state to provide those social goods makes for war and conflict.'^ The idea that peace has to be constructed can sound eithet Utopian Of grim. The Utopian sound occurs when it is taken (often by pacifists) to mean that with good will, peace can be constructed and going to war will never even seem necessary'^ The grim note is struck by the political realist who holds that, while no parricular war is inevitable, the worid is unlikely ever to be completely ftee of war. The pacifist says: "If you want peace, work for jusrice, and you won't have to fight." The realist says: "If you want peace, work for justice, and be prepared to fight for them." Michael Howatd remarks that the victors in Worid War II drew the realist inference: "In the piocess [of the wat] it had become cleai that militaiy powei was necessaiy not only to the establishment, but also to the preservation of peace."^'' After 1945, small European countries like Norway Denmark, Nethedands, and Belgium abandoned their previous neutrality in favor of collective secuiity; so, notably, did the United States. The option foi collective security is based on the hard lesson that preserving peace requires a realistic military policy and a pioporrionate mihtary establishment capable of fighring a serious war. A peace-preserving military must also actively keep up to date, for just Building the Peace-Relation I have argued that peace is better understood as a relarion rhan as a state of affuirs. Classifying it as a relarion directs attenrion to the enriries that it relates, which, in the context of the ethics of war, are polirical agents (whether individual heads of government or communities). A number of points can be added.
First, the quality of the relation will vary from instance to instance. In 2017, the United States is at peace with Japan and at peace with China, so here are two peaceful relations involving the United States. The US-Japan peace-relarion is considerably deeper and stronger than is the US-China peace-relarion. Japan is an ally of the United States and has a similar political system, whereas China has a different polirical system, and is not an ally but a rival that aims to reduce US influence in East Asia. Outbreak of war berween the United States and Japan has miniscule probabiUty, war between the United States and China at some point in the next 20 years has a non-trivial probabflity Second, relarions evolve and change. Assuming neither the United States nor China wants war, each government has to develop the relation between them, while seeking to protect its own interests, in a way that ensures war does not happen. The development of the relarion can be expected to include both progress and setbacks. I have, earlier in this chapter, argued that jus ad bellum's just cause and right intention require taking cognizance of the ups and downs of international relations, as well as the danger of misunderstanding and miscalculation when the quality of the peace-relation between two states is poor. In the crisis when war looms, consideration of just cause cannot be confined to focusing on one parricular acrion taken by the other side; it must be retrospective on the recent history between the two states. The right intention condition will require not merely consideration of what strategic defeat of the other state would amount to but also some projection, of a realistic kind, of the future relation between the two states.
Third, the idea of peace as a relation has intuitive appeal in the context of ethnic, religious, or racial intercommunal tensions periodically erupting into armed conflict. In the case of such divided communities recovering from or seeking to avoid future intercommunal conflict, treaties and other legal instruments may be infrequent. But even where they are used, it is usually in relatively acute awateness of the fact that no set of legal arrangements will alone sufflce to keep the peace.^^ Fourth, when each side recognizes that there are goods and benefits available to it provided it cooperates with the other side, and recognizes rhat internadonal telations ate not a zero-sum game and that its own long-term interests may sometimes be served by judicious assistance of the other, this amounts to a recognition of there being common goodscommon because only cooperation can achieve them.^^ Even the United States and the USSR, avowed enemies thtoughout the Cold War era, recognized that they shared an interest in avoiding a nuclear war.
For any relation between states, communities, and persons, the bottom line of "What do I get out of it?" has to be factored in. Building peace depends upon seeing one's own state benefiting from providing some space for the othet to floutish. An important patt of the peacerelation will be the give-and-take of negotiating with each other, bargaining, persuading and conceding, learning from the other, and slowly working out the specifics of the concrete good of a peaceful relation.
Peace: What Kind of Good?
Christine Korsgaard has drawn attention to the difference between two distinctions in goodness or value^"*: the means/end distinction and the extrinsic/intnnsic distinction.25 That clarification is helpful in relation to specifying the kind of value peace represents.
As legards die means/end distinction, the just war ttadition deems peace impottant enough to qualify as of value as an end. There seems no need to argue for that. Interestingly it is also good as a means. In most cases, the end of peace is promoted by peaceful means and practices, including diplomacy and judicious concessions to the interests of others, even down to using non-aggressive language, as already noted. In the case of two countries sliding towards war, where there is past unhappy history yet where neither wants war and is open to negotiation, the peacefijl means of renewed dialogue, compromise, mediation by others and the like ate the most likely to avert wan fiere peace has instrumental value, for there is just enough of a peace-relation remaining berween them to make it possible to move away from war widiout losing face or suffering political disadvantage. Under happier conditions, where two states are friends and alhes, the peace-relation is also enjoyed in the very activity of deepening that peace.
Turning to the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction, peace being a relation means that it is an extrinsic and not an intrinsic good. One of Korsgaard's purposes in making rhe disrinction was to draw attenrion to rhe fact that something being good as an end did not mean that it was intrinsically good. That is illuminating in this context. Her distincrion challenges the temptation to assume that peace being good as an end is thereby intrinsically good so that it necessarily has significant value in all circumstances, no matter how unjust or life-threatening the relational context in which it is gtounded. For reasons given eariier, this view is incorrect.
Where it is realized or instantiated in a relation berween rwo srates or communities, it will be part of a nerwoik of relations between them. The holistic concrere relation between two states, where the peace berween them is so deep-rooted and established that they are not merely not at war, nor even merely allies, but friends, instantiates several distinct relational or extrinsic values. The deepening of the peace-relation and rhe realization of its value requires a heuristic approach that can perceive that the political and public policy steps creating that concrete good may become available only as time goes by and eatlier steps have been taken. Peace is a relation, and the process of deepening ir does not quickly reach a terminus. Notes 1. For a summary of>^ post bellum's thought, see Orend (2005 
